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INTRODUCTION
An Alabama jury decided an advertorial2 in the New York
Times defamed an Alabama police commissioner.3 The Postmaster
General decided the book Lady Chatterley’s Lover was obscene.4 A
Florida court decided editorial articles in the Miami Herald, which
criticized the court’s handling of criminal cases, were contemptuous
and a clear and present danger to judicial administration.5 Cases
like these raise the question whether an appellate court must defer
to the original fact-finder and accept these findings of fact.6
Typically, procedural rules demand deference to lower court
findings of fact,7 but a special exception is made for “constitutional
facts” that implicate the First Amendment.8
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of
scrupulously safeguarding the line between protected and
unprotected speech. The Court has been emphatic that “freedoms
of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.”9 In
safeguarding speech, procedural bulwarks can be just as important
as the scope of substantive protections.10 “The history of American
2 On March 29, 1960, a full-page advertisement titled “Heed Their Rising Voices”
was sponsored by a group of civil rights leaders seeking to raise funds for Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.’s legal defense. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-57
(1964).
3 See id.
4 See Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); see
also Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (considering the extent of a postmaster’s power
to regulate obscenity); Edward de Grazia, Obscenity and the Mail: A Study of
Administrative Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 608 (1955) (discussing the postal
obscenity regulatory power).
5 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
6 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
7 As used in this Essay, the term “lower court findings of fact” includes facts found
by a jury as well as by a trial judge.
8 The term “Constitutional Fact Doctrine” began in the legal scholarship and was
then adopted by the courts. Professor John Dickinson is credited with coining the term.
E.g., Arthur Larson, The Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact”, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 185, 186 n.4
(1941) (suggesting term “originated with John Dickinson in Crowell v. Benson; Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of ‘Constitutional Fact’, 80 U. PA.
L. REV. 1055 (1932)”); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U.
L. REV. 14, 26 (1992) (same).
9 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (“Our insistence that
regulations of obscenity scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards
is therefore but a special instance of the larger principle that the freedoms of expression
must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.”) (internal citations omitted).
10 E.g., Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First Amendment
Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (1996) (observing that “in
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freedom,” Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, “is, in no small
measure, the history of procedure.”11 And as a contemporary
scholar noted, “many of the most important First Amendment
issues today involve not so much what is protected as the question
of how speech is protected and who protects it.”12 At its core,
“procedure is power”.13 To that end, scholars note, “Substantive
rights, including constitutional rights, are worth no more than the
procedural mechanisms available for their realization and
protection.”14
Animated by the concern for individual liberties, the Supreme
Court has crafted a number of procedural protections unique to
First Amendment cases.15 For example, in a defamation lawsuit,
the plaintiff now bears the burden of proving the requisite level of
fault.16 At common law, a plaintiff needed only prove the defendant
many ways the judicial process is as important as the substantive right”) (emphasis in
original); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518,
518 (1970) (observing that procedural protections play a “large role in protecting freedom
of speech”).
11 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id.
at 413-14 (“The safeguards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’
summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna
Carta and reflected in the constitutional development of our people. The history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”).
12 Childress, supra note 10, at 1300 (emphasis in original).
13 Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power–A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291,
1292 (2000).
14 Id. at 1293; accord Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV.
U. L. REV. 317, 317 (2012) (“One crucial aspect of the Roberts Court’s decision making
has been its systematically closing the courthouse doors to those suing corporations, to
those suing the government, to criminal defendants, and to plaintiffs in general. Taken
together, these separate decisions have had a great cumulative impact in denying access
to the courts to those who claim that their rights have been violated. The Roberts Court
often has been able to achieve substantive results favored by conservatives through these
procedural devices.”).
15 E.g., Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 n.12 (1986)
(“‘[P]rocedural safeguards often have a special bite in the First Amendment context.’
Commentators have discussed the importance of procedural safeguards in our analysis
of obscenity, overbreadth, vagueness, and public forum permits. The purpose of these
safeguards is to insure that the government treads with sensitivity in areas freighted
with First Amendment concerns.”) (quoting GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1373 (10th ed. 1980) (citing Monaghan, supra note 10, at 520524; LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734-736 (1978); Vince Blasi,
Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1481, 1534-1572 (1970)); see also
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 259 n.167
(1985) (noting “the due process clause takes on a special meaning where important
substantive constitutional values—such as freedom of speech—are at stake”).
16 E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 133-34, 155 (1967); New York
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intentionally or negligently published a defamatory statement; the
defendant did not need to know the statement was false or of its
defamatory nature. But to ensure that “debate on public issues”
would be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” the Court shifted
the burden to public officials and public figures to prove that the
defendant knew the statement was false or acted with reckless
disregard of the statement’s truth or falsity (i.e., actual malice).17
For matters of public concern, the plaintiff now bears the burden of
proving falsity.18 And the plaintiff must prove actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere
preponderance of the evidence.19 Thus the Court has enhanced
procedural protections for speech by elevating and shifting burdens
of proof.
The Court has not only altered burdens of proof at trial; it has
When
also altered the standard of review on appeal.20
“constitutional facts” are involved, the Court has rejected the
traditional deference to lower court fact-finders.21 To safeguard the
line between protected and unprotected speech, appellate courts are
authorized to engage in an independent review of the record, rather
than simply defer to the original fact-finder.22
Independent appellate review, also called the Constitutional
Fact Doctrine,23 is the focus of this Essay. Part I examines the
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
17 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
18 E.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
19 E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511
(1984); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 28586.
20 E.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, The Collision Between the First Amendment and
Securities Fraud, 65 ALA. L. REV. 903, 916 (2014) (“The safety net of independent review
affords a speaker confidence that, even if the trier of fact were to be influenced by
prejudice, the ‘clear and convincing’ evidence and ‘actual malice’ standards would be
subject to a non-deferential review on appeal.”).
21 See infra Parts I & II.
22 E.g., Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1972) (conducting independent
assessment whether a poem was obscene); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
54 (1971) (performing independent assessment whether a statement was made with
actual malice).
23 The term Constitutional Fact Doctrine is used interchangeably with independent
or plenary appellate review. Accord Nathan S. Chapman, The Jury’s Constitutional
Judgment, 67 ALA. L. REV. 189, 229 (2015) (“Courts have variously referred to the
doctrine as the constitutional fact doctrine or the independent review doctrine.”); Adam
Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 50 DUKE L.J. 1427, 1430 (2001) (“De novo review of the facts
underlying the application of a constitutional standard is often characterized as the
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nature and origins of the Constitutional Fact Doctrine. Part II
explores the Court’s rationale for creating an exception to the
typical deference and authorizing independent appellate review.
Part III highlights the circuit split and unresolved question of
whether the doctrine applies symmetrically or asymmetrically.
And Part IV justifies a proposal for an asymmetric application of
the Constitutional Fact Doctrine to protect free-speech-claimants.
Thus, this Essay explores how the procedural protection of
independent appellate review of constitutional facts can be
harnessed to fructify the First Amendment. 24
I.

NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT DOCTRINE

A perennial jurisprudential question is how and when an
appellate court should defer to fact-findings made in a lower court.25
Standards of appellate review channel decision-making authority
between trial and appellate levels.26 When an appellate court
reviews a matter deferentially, the center of gravity of that decision
rests with the lower court.27 On the other hand, if an appellate
review of ‘constitutional fact.’ In describing the standard at work in constitutional fact
review, courts use several interchangeable terms, including ‘de novo,’ ‘free,’
‘independent,’ and ‘plenary’ review.”).
24 Cf. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918) (“The
safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis
and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests . . . .”), overruled in part by Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
25 Cf. Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI.
L. REV. 190, 190 (1937) (“The chief problems involved in a complete union of law and
equity concern the preservation of the jury trial right as required by the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution. . . . Traditionally, and for historical reasons, the equity
review is a re-examination of the entire record, on both the facts and the law, while that
at law is limited to a consideration of the legal errors which may have been committed
by the trial court.”); 9C CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2571, at 223-24 (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2018) (“The provision in Rule 52(a) stating that
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous represents a statement of
what was considered to be the federal equity practice in the years just prior to the merger
of law and equity.”).
26 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 997 (1986) (“Scope of review,
therefore, is the principal means by which adjudicative decisional power and
responsibility are divided between the trial and appellate levels.”).
27 Bryan Adamson, Critical Error: Courts’ Refusal to Recognize Intentional Race
Discrimination Findings as Constitutional Facts, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2009)
(“As a general proposition, standards of review confine appellate inquiry and judgments
within a discrete decisional framework. For example, by directing that facts found by a
trial court be reviewed only for clear error, Rule 52(a) binds the appellate judge to
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court can decide the matter anew, finality on that question does not
rest with the lower court.
It is axiomatic that trial courts are primarily responsible for
fact-finding, and appellate courts are primarily responsible for lawdeveloping.28 The Supreme Court has long recognized the “good old
rule” that questions of fact are generally the province of the jury,
but questions of law are generally the province of the court.29
Federal procedure directs that questions of fact are reviewed
deferentially, whereas questions of law are reviewed de novo.30
A jury verdict will be upheld on appeal if it is supported by
substantial evidence.31 Substantial evidence means more than a
mere scintilla; it means relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.32 On a motion
for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), a trial court reviews the
evidence—without weighing the credibility of the evidence—to
assess whether there is only one reasonable conclusion as to the
proper verdict in the case.33 The trial court may grant a JMOL
respond to the facts in a particular way and not to engage in a more active inquiry.”).
28 E.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 657 (1988) (“[T]rial courts
are primarily responsible for sifting the evidence and finding the facts, while appellate
courts are primarily responsible for developing the law.”); Louis, supra note 26, at 994
(“[F]act-finding is the special province of the trial level, law declaration is the special
province of the appellate level, and the distinction between fact and law is the primary
means by which the trial and appellate levels divide decisional power between them.”);
see also Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (“Most depictions
of appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and
refinement of law and the correction of error.”).
29 See Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794); see also Bushell’s Case, 124
E.R. 1006 (1670) (Vaughn, C.J.).
30 E.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (“Rule 52(a) broadly
requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . . The Rule does
not apply to conclusions of law.”).
31 E.g. Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A jury’s verdict must be
upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence . . . even if it is also possible to draw a
contrary conclusion.”); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229, 1233 (10th
Cir. 1996). On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a trial court reviews a jury
verdict for reasonableness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (“If a party has been fully heard on an
issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A)
resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be
maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”).
32 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
33 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), (b); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (emphasizing that the “court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
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when no “reasonable jury” could find for a party on a given issue.34
Not only are a jury’s findings entitled to deference, but a bench
trial’s findings are also entitled to deference upon review. In a
bench trial, the trial court’s findings will be accepted on appeal
unless clearly erroneous.35 Review under the clearly erroneous
standard is, according to the Supreme Court, “significantly
deferential,”36 requiring an appellate court to have a “definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” before
disturbing fact-findings.37
While there are technical distinctions between reviewing jury
findings for substantial evidence and trial court findings for clear
error, both fact-finders are generally reviewed deferentially.38 This
Essay adopts the fiction that appellate court deference for questions
of fact is binary: either a finding is given deference or it is not.
Gradations of appellate deference (plenary, clear error, abuse of
discretion, substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, some
evidence, reasonable basis, etc.) are irrelevant to the analysis
herein. Thus, on appeal, findings of fact—in a bench trial or a jury
trial—are given deference, whereas conclusions of law are given
non-deferential, plenary review.39
A notable exception to the typical deference to trial court factfinding—either in a bench trial or a jury trial—is the Constitutional
determinations or weigh the evidence”) (citations omitted).
34 Under Rule 50, a trial court should grant a judgment as a matter of law only when
“a party has been fully heard on an issue” and there is no “legally sufficient evidentiary
basis” for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
35 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”).
36 Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993).
37 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (citation omitted); Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (citation omitted).
38 E.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging
different labels of appellate review, but suggesting “heretically” there are “operationally
only two degrees of review, plenary (that is, no deference given to the tribunal being
reviewed) and deferential”).
39 It is important to acknowledge that questions of fact and questions of law are not
hermetically distinct. The Supreme Court acknowledged “the vexing nature of the
distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). And a chimerical category of “mixed questions of law and fact”
has long bedeviled courts and commentators. E.g., id. at 290 n.19; Evan Tsen Lee,
Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed
Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 236 (1991) (the blended nature of mixed
questions “seems to sit precisely at the midpoint between the Scylla of allowing errors to
go uncorrected and the Charybdis of judicial inefficiency”).
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Fact Doctrine.40 When a free speech interest is at stake, the gravity
of the interest overrides the usual deference accorded to lower court
fact-finding.41 Modern scholars call the Constitutional Fact
Doctrine “[o]ne of the most misunderstood and undervalued
subjects in federal jurisdiction.”42 It is a powerful tool, and scholars
worry about the potential to misapply the doctrine.43 Scholars have
long urged for a limiting principle to prevent independent appellate
review from “wander[ing]”44 into inappropriate areas.45
Independent appellate review of fact-finding started in the
In certain cases, the Court
administrative law context.46
independently reviewed facts determined by an administrative
agency, including rate-making valuation for takings purposes,47
citizenship determinations for deportation purposes,48 and
employee status for worker’s compensation purposes.49 The
heightened review was premised on due process concerns, and
judicial reluctance to grant administrative agencies the final word
on such findings of fact. But over time, Lochner-era economic

40 E.g., Kevin Casey, Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review
in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 302-03 (2002)
(“There are rare exceptions to deferential appellate review of fact-findings. Among these
exceptions are the constitutional facts which were discussed in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc.[, 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984)]. Resolving a conflict between
constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court held that Rule 52(a) does not apply to a
finding that a disparaging statement about the sound quality of the plaintiff’s
loudspeakers was made with ‘actual malice.’ The actual reach of such exceptions is
unclear, and the value of the exceptions outside litigation involving freedom of speech or
freedom of the press is uncertain.”).
41 Christie, supra note 8, at 55 (“The [constitutional fact] doctrine asserts that
regardless of the nature of the epistemological operations involved in the resolution of
certain issues, Rule 52(a) simply does not apply because the issues involved are too
important.”).
42 Martin H. Redish & William D. Gohl, The Wandering Doctrine of Constitutional
Fact, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 289 (2017).
43 See infra Part IV.
44 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 485
(1984) (alleging product disparagement on the basis that stereo speakers produced
sounds that “wander[ed] ‘about the room’”).
45 E.g., Redish & Gohl, supra note 42, at 289.
46 Louis, supra note 26, at 995 (“In the period following the New Deal, courts and
commentators carefully examined these variations in institutional deference and their
sources, primarily from the administrative law perspective, because of the sudden
proliferation of and interest in federal administrative agencies and agency
adjudication.”).
47 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 298 (1920).
48 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
49 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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substantive due process50 fell out of vogue.51 And as administrative
law evolved, the need for independent review of agency
determinations waned.52
While plenary appellate review of factual determinations
withered in the administrative agency context, it found resurgence
in the First Amendment context.53 Independent appellate review
found new life in substantive protections for individual liberties.
The Constitutional Fact Doctrine evolved from the plenary review
of administrative agency’s jurisdictional fact determinations.54 But
it’s not so much that jurisdictional fact review created
constitutional fact review, rather the Court embraced and
repurposed a tool it had previously employed.55 Thus independent
appellate review of an agency’s jurisdictional facts was a gateway
for the Court to adopt de novo review of constitutional facts.56 So
while independent appellate review was initially rooted in
administrative law jurisprudence, a successor manifestation of
50 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down legislation setting
maximum hours for bakers as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause).
51 E.g., 33 THE LATE CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8404 (1st ed. 2018) (“In deference to
agency authority and expertise, de novo review by the courts of agency findings of fact is
highly disfavored.”); see also 30A THE LATE CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6358 (1st ed. 2018)
(discussing the Progressive Era).
52 Louis, supra note 26, at 1030 (“[A]rising out of judicial review of administrative,
statutorily defined findings of ultimate fact, the jurisdictional fact doctrine in effect
transformed itself into the doctrine of constitutional fact.”); see also Hoffman, supra note
23, at 1445 (“Constitutional fact initially emerged in the administrative law context at
least in part out of concern for procedural safeguards of both economic and individual
constitutional rights.”).
53 Id. at 1445 (“As the administrative line died out, a line of cases developed that
applied independent fact review out of concern for both individual procedural rights and
the need for the appellate courts to guide issues in which law finds meaning only through
its application to facts. Over time, the latter rationale came to dominate the ‘procedural
line.’ However, another family of cases emerged in which independent review was again
primarily justified by potential threats to individual liberties, this time substantive First
Amendment rights.”).
54 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1785 (2003) (“The doctrine emerged from the jurisdictional-fact
doctrine announced in Crowell v. Benson[, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)].”).
55 Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 700 n.55 (2013)
(“This is not to say that Crowell created constitutional fact review. Rather, Crowell ‘both
confirmed and generalized’ a rule that the Court had already embraced in earlier cases.”)
(citation omitted).
56 Allen & Pardo, supra note 54, at 1785-86 (“The doctrine became a tool for courts
to use to reexamine the facts in constitutional cases.”).
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constitutional fact review has flourished in First Amendment
jurisprudence.57
The “renascent”58 Constitutional Fact Doctrine was premised
on First Amendment due process concerns.59 In First Amendment
cases, the Court has applied plenary appellate review to findings
underlying defamation judgments, obscenity prosecutions, and
other judicial proceedings implicating the free speech right.60 In
defamation suits brought by public figures, whether a defendant
acted with actual malice is reviewed de novo.61 In obscenity cases,
whether the work lacks serious value is reviewed de novo.62 In
breach of the peace prosecutions, whether the defendant’s conduct
actually breached the peace is reviewed de novo.63 In contempt
cases involving media coverage critical of the administration of
criminal justice in pending cases, whether the coverage presented
a “threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and good
order of the courts” is reviewed de novo.64 Part II takes a closer look
at the Court’s rationale for engaging in constitutional fact review.

57 E.g., Louis, supra note 26, at 995-96 n.15 (“Most constitutional fact cases today
arise out of the Bill of Rights and deal with such questions as whether a film is obscene
under the first amendment or whether a confession is coerced under the fifth
amendment.”).
58 Frank R. Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of “Constitutional Fact”, 46 N.C. L. REV.
223, 240 (1968); id. (“While constitutional limits have receded in the area of economic
interests, they have made rapid and revolutionary advances as concerns First
Amendment freedoms.”).
59 Scholars have questioned whether limiting the doctrine to First Amendment cases
is justified. Redish & Gohl, supra note 42, at 324 (“Nor is there anything inherently
‘special’ about constitutional, as opposed to non-constitutional, claims that give rise to
an implied right of supervisory review.”); Allen & Pardo, supra note 54, at 1787 (“While
Bose emphasized the constitutional importance of the issue—and that the ‘vexing nature’
of the law-fact distinction did not diminish the importance—the Court did not explain
why the ‘importance’ does not extend to all constitutional issues.”); Christie, supra note
8, at 30 (“Do all questions of constitutional law application demand independent
appellate review? Or is the doctrine more limited, applying merely to ‘every instance of
[F]irst [A]mendment law application’ and perhaps a limited number of other
situations?”) (quoting Monaghan, supra note 15, at 269)).
60 E.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 567 (1995) (applying constitutional fact review to a state court’s conclusion that a
First Amendment claimant’s expression lacked essential attributes of protected speech).
61 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
62 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-02 (1987).
63 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 544-51 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235-38 (1963).
64 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946).
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RATIONALE FOR ENGAGING IN CONSTITUTIONAL FACT
REVIEW

To ensure that protected speech is not improperly prohibited,
appellate courts engage in an independent review of the underlying
facts that have a constitutional dimension. In New York Times v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court independently assessed the facts,
found the newspaper did not publish the advertorial with the
requisite level of fault (actual malice), and rejected the Alabama
The Sullivan Court enhanced
jury’s defamation verdict.65
procedural protections for speech in three distinct ways: (1) by
requiring public official plaintiffs to prove a publisher’s statement
was made with actual malice;66 (2) by requiring that such plaintiffs
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence;67 and (3) by
engaging in an independent appellate review of the record to assess
whether the evidence satisfied the constitutional standard of actual
malice.68 Together these new procedural protections were intended
to shield publishers’ mistakes and to minimize the chill on “public
debate”69 by providing publishers with ample “breathing space”70 to
avoid “self-censorship.”71
The Court justified its independent, non-deferential review of
the facts because of the gravity of the constitutional issue at stake.72
In the words of the Court, independent appellate review of the lower
court is necessary to ensure that “the judgment does not constitute
65 376 U.S. 254, 256, 283-84 (1964); see also Strong, supra note 58, at 243 (“[T]he
historic New York Times case is significant for the simultaneous appearance of a newlydrawn constitutional line and full-blown constitutional fact.”).
66 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
67 Id. at 285-86.
68 Id. at 285. Accord Couture, supra note 20, at 916; Gary Anthony Paranzino, Note,
The Future of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1986).
69 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (observing a loyalty oath “has an unmistakable tendency to
chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice”).
70 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
71 Id. at 279 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959)).
72 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 220 (1964) (“The Court makes
actual malice a ‘constitutional fact’ that it will review de novo and indeed did review de
novo in the case itself.”); see also Allen & Pardo, supra note 54, at 1786 (“Under the
auspices of constitutional-fact review, appellate courts must review de novo the ‘actual
malice’ element in defamation suits.” (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)).
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a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”73 The Court’s
ruling in Sullivan, according to Professor Harry Kalven, Jr.,
“reflects a strategy that requires that speech be overprotected in
order to assure that it is not underprotected.”74 The core premise
of the Sullivan Court’s decision is that legal liability will chill
robust debate.75
As the Court noted, “the line between speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated,
suppressed, or punished is finely drawn,” and it calls for “sensitive
tools” to separate legitimate from illegitimate speech.76 One such
sensitive tool is the Constitutional Fact Doctrine, by which the
Court embraced the “responsibility” to independently examine
whether the speech at issue is indeed unprotected.77 For example,
in Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court rejected the defendant’s
conviction for a breach of the peace, and emphasized its “duty . . .
to make an independent examination of the whole record.”78
Concluding that “the record is barren of any evidence of ‘fighting
words,’”79 and underscoring that a state may not “make criminal
the peaceful expression of unpopular views,”80 the Court overturned
the defendant’s criminal conviction.
For cases involving defamation, obscenity, or fighting words,
free speech rights often turn on questions of fact. In defamation
cases the question often turns on the defendant’s state of mind and
whether the publication was made with actual malice.81 In
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285.
Kalven, supra note 72, at 213.
75 E.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1256, 1267 n.62 (2005) (“The entire Sullivan rule is based on the irreducibly
empirical and contingent premise that publishers at risk of legal liability will refrain
from engaging in ‘uninhibited,’ ‘wide-open,’ and ‘robust’ reportage—a premise that may
be more contestable than the Court believed in Sullivan.”) (citation omitted).
76 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
77 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (“The Constitution has imposed
upon this Court final authority to determine the meaning and application of those words
of that instrument which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that
responsibility, we are compelled to examine for ourselves the statements in issue and
the circumstances under which they were made to see whether or not they do carry a
threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and good order of the courts or
whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.”) (citations omitted).
78 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
79 Id. at 236 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
80 Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237.
81 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
73
74
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obscenity cases the question often turns on whether a work is
patently offensive and lacks serious value.82 Thus for cases
involving First Amendment interests, findings of fact are often
inextricably intertwined with constitutional rights. A factual error
in the trial court – by the judge or jury – can improperly deny a
constitutional liberty. To guard against improper denial of speech
interests, the Supreme Court embraces an obligation to
independently review the facts underlying the constitutional issue,
rather than apply the typical deferential review of the facts.83
Independent review applies in a full range of cases that
implicate speech interests. Writing for the Court in Roth v. United
States, Justice William Brennan confirmed that “obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.”84 The
Court explained that obscenity falls outside of First Amendment
protection because such low-value speech is “utterly without
The Court then instructed
redeeming social importance.”85
appellate courts to independently assess whether the material
meets the constitutional definition of obscenity.86 Again writing for
the Court, Justice Brennan reiterated, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, that
“this Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional
judgment on the facts of the case as to whether the material
involved is constitutionally protected.”87 The Court did not
shoulder this burden lightly or with pleasure; rather the Court
accepted this responsibility as a matter of duty:
We are told that the determination whether a particular
motion picture, book, or other work of expression is obscene can
be treated as a purely factual judgment on which a jury’s
verdict is all but conclusive, or that in any event the decision
can be left essentially to state and lower federal courts, with
82 E.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (reviewing de novo, and
reversing, a unanimous jury determination that the movie “Carnal Knowledge” was
patently offensive while recognizing that the “patently offensive” determination was one
of fact).
83 E.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at
Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 n.4 (2018) (“Usually but not always: In the
constitutional realm, for example, the calculus changes. There, we have often held that
the role of appellate courts ‘in marking out the limits of [a] standard through the process
of case-by-case adjudication’ favors de novo review even when answering a mixed
question primarily involves plunging into a factual record.”) (citations omitted).
84 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
85 Id. at 484.
86 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1964).
87 Id. at 190.
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this Court exercising only a limited review such as that needed
to determine whether the ruling below is supported by
“sufficient evidence.” The suggestion is appealing, since it
would lift from our shoulders a difficult, recurring, and
unpleasant task. But we cannot accept it. Such an abnegation
of judicial supervision in this field would be inconsistent with
our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees. Since it is
only “obscenity” that is excluded from the constitutional
protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene
necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional law. Such an
issue, we think, must ultimately be decided by this Court. Our
duty admits of no “substitute for facing up to the tough
individual problems of constitutional judgment involved in
every obscenity case.”88

De novo review of obscenity cases risked turning the Supreme
Court into a “Super Censor” for the nation.89 But the Court had no
choice, according to Justice Brennan, because the Court had the
duty to uphold constitutional law.90 Material is unprotected only if
it is obscene; hence the Court was obligated to ensure that the
material is indeed obscene, and thus outside First Amendment
protection.91
Whether speech falls into an unprotected class is a matter of
constitutional judgment; it is not simply a question of fact. As
Justice John Marshall Harlan stated:

Id. at 187-88 (citations omitted).
See id. at 203 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the risk of the “Court’s sitting
as the Super Censor of all the obscenity purveyed throughout the Nation”).
90 Some scholars question whether it is indeed a duty or merely at the discretion of
the Court. Compare Monaghan, supra note 15, at 264 (“To be sure, appellate courts often
exercise independent judgment with respect to constitutional law application. But I see
no persuasive case for converting this competence into a duty.”), with DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 127 (2008)
(“The duty to define the Constitution’s meaning effectively incorporates the duty to
ensure its proper application. This can only be accomplished by some heightened level
of review of constitutional case-specific fact-finding. In free speech cases, this is
unambiguously accomplished by the use of independent review by appellate courts.”).
91 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 187-88 (“Such an abnegation of judicial supervision in this
field would be inconsistent with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees. Since
it is only ‘obscenity’ that is excluded from the constitutional protection, the question
whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional
law. Such an issue, we think, must ultimately be decided by this Court. Our duty admits
of no ‘substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems of constitutional judgment
involved in every obscenity case.’”) (citations omitted).
88
89
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I do not think that reviewing courts can escape this
responsibility by saying that the trier of the facts, be it a jury
or a judge, has labeled the questioned matter as “obscene,” for,
if “obscenity” is to be suppressed, the question whether a
particular work is of that character involves not really an issue
of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most
sensitive and delicate kind.92

Unless the Court adopted an all-or-nothing approach, it was
saddled with the responsibility of deciding on a case-by-case basis.
As Justice Harlan stated: “Short of saying that no material relating
to sex may be banned, or that all of it may be, I do not see how this
Court can escape the task of reviewing obscenity decisions on a
The Court was thereby required to
case-by-case basis.”93
independently review the fact-finding of the censors.94
The Court extracted itself from “‘the intractable obscenity
problem’”95 by crafting a new test for obscenity. In Miller v.
California,96 the Court crafted a three-part test that requires courts
to assess whether a work depicts or describes sexual conduct that
“taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient interest,” portrays
“sexual conduct in a patently offensive way,” and does not “have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” under
“contemporary community standards.”97 With the Miller test, the
Court was essentially allowed to halt the high volume of
independent appellate review of obscenity cases.98 In a span of
92 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
93 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 460 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 427 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If there is to be censorship, the wisdom of
experts on such matters as literary merit and historical significance must be evaluated.
On this record, the Court has no choice but to reverse the judgment of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, irrespective of whether we would include Fanny Hill in our own
libraries.”); see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (“[T]he burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor.”).
95 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
96 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
97 Id. at 24.
98 William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 119 (1960) (after articulating
reasonably clear standards, “[o]nly an occasional review by the Supreme Court should
be needed to clarify the standards”); Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1454 n.153 (2001) (“The
Miller decision largely enabled the Court to declare victory and leave the field, but
obscenity cases still occasionally would be granted certiorari.”). But see C. Peter Magrath,
The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 7, 8 (1966) (suggesting the
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twenty years leading up to Miller, the Court heard nearly 90
obscenity cases,99 and it has reviewed only a handful after.100 The
Court had been frustrated by the vague and variable I-know-itwhen-I-see-it standard,101 and it was searching for a more
instructive test to guide the lower courts.102 The Miller test
answered the call. The Miller test extracted the Court from the
high volume of obscenity cases much the same way the Miranda v.
Arizona103 rule alleviated the Court from the surfeit of fact-specific
determinations of voluntary confessions by criminal defendants.
Much like the glut of obscenity cases, the Court similarly had been
enmeshed in a nimiety of de novo review of voluntary confessions
in criminal cases – until the Court crafted a new rule. In other
words, like with the Miller obscenity test, the Court had been mired
in fact-specific voluntary confession cases until the Court crafted

Warren Court’s “problems are of its own making” because “[t]he Warren Court, after all,
is very probably the most activist tribunal in our constitutional history, and this activism
is largely responsible for its confrontation with a seemingly endless crop of hard cases”).
99 CLAY CALVERT ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 488 (20th ed. 2018) (“Between 1957 and
1977, for example, the high court heard arguments in almost 90 obscenity cases and
wrote opinions in nearly 40 of those cases. In stark contrast, as of the start of 2018, the
Supreme Court had not heard a single obscenity case in the 21st century involving
whether or not a particular movie, book, magazine, Web site or other media product was
obscene. It has, instead, considered other issues since the year 2000, such as the
constitutionality of statutes regulating child pornography, virtual (computer-generated)
child pornography and nonobscene sexual content on the Internet.”).
100 E.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974) (concluding, upon de novo
review of “Carnal Knowledge,” that the movie did not satisfy the Miller test).
101 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
that.”).
102 Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind
the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 49 (1985) (“In the years following Jacobellis, the Brennan
approach to independent review dominated in obscenity cases. As Chief Justice Burger
explained in Miller v. California, the absence of a majority view compelled the Court
routinely to reverse convictions for the dissemination of allegedly obscene materials
summarily when at least five members of the Court, applying their separate tests, found
the materials to be protected by the first amendment.”); Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1454
(“Finally, in Miller v. California, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a clearly frustrated
majority of six in trying to put an end to ‘the “intractable obscenity problem”’ by drawing
a bright line limiting obscenity to hard-core pornography that contains the depiction or
description of sexual conduct or genitalia. It cannot be said that this rule emerged from
the process of applying the previous obscenity standard; it was more an attempt to limit
the Court’s involvement in an arena in which application had utterly failed to produce a
clearer rule.”) (citations omitted).
103 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the Miranda warning.104 As one scholar noted, “Miranda itself can
be understood as an effort by the Court to develop a clear rule that
would free it from case-by-case determinations of voluntariness.”105
While a clear legal rule provides better guidance to the lower courts
and helps alleviate some of the burden on the appellate courts, it
does not relieve an appellate court of its duty to protect
constitutional liberties.106
In Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union, the Supreme Court
reiterated its constitutional duty to conduct an independent, nondeferential examination of an actual malice determination.107 Bose
Corporation, maker of loudspeakers, sued Consumer Reports for
publishing an article critical of its product: the Bose 901 stereo
speakers. The article stated, in part, that “individual instruments
heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic
proportions and tended to wander about the room.”108 Allegations
that the speakers produced sounds that wandered around the room
was undesirable and Bose sued for product disparagement.109 After
a nineteen-day bench trial, the district court found the statement

104 See Strong, supra note 58, at 281-82 (discussing the long line of forced confession
cases and establishing that Escobedo and Miranda are in great part a consequence of
the Court’s growing concern over the heavy burden of independent review in this class
of constitutional litigation); Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1452 (“[T]he Court was drawn
into a series of highly fact-specific inquiries that did not result in clear rules such that
the Court could ever leave the field. The Court finally escaped this burden of review only
by vastly simplifying voluntariness down to the technicalities of Escobedo and
Miranda.”) (citations omitted).
105 Keith R. Dolliver, Comment, Voluntariness of Confessions in Habeas Corpus
Proceedings: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 145
(1990) (citations omitted).
106 Cf. Louis, supra note 26, at 1027 n.251 (“Arguably, the Court has formulated
bright line constitutional tests in other areas to avoid the burden of reviewing endless
findings of constitutional fact.”).
107 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984).
108 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1253
(D. Mass. 1981).
109 Id. at 1267 (“The testimony at trial showed that a certain degree of movement of
the location of the apparent sound source is to be expected with all stereo loudspeaker
systems. Such movement is a natural consequence of the stereo recording process and is
due to the various polar radiation patterns produced by an instrument at various
frequencies. Because such movement between two loudspeakers is a common effect and
is to be expected, a reader would not be surprised to read about ‘instruments’ moving
along the wall between two loudspeakers. Movement throughout the other areas of the
room, however, is not to be expected. Such a bizarre effect is contrary to what the average
listener has become accustomed and would probably be found objectionable by most
listeners.”).
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that the speakers produced sounds that “wander about the room”
was false, disparaging,110 and published with actual malice.111
On independent appellate review, the Supreme Court
concluded that the record did not contain clear and convincing
evidence that the author of the product review acted with actual
malice.112 Whether a particular statement is stripped of First
Amendment protection, the Court noted, “is not merely a question
for the trier of fact.”113 Rather, the Court instructed that appellate
courts “must independently decide whether the evidence in the
record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars
the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and
convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’”114
Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion for the Court, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, stated that the
independent appellate examination rule “reflects a deeply held
conviction that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—
must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties
established and ordained by the Constitution.”115 The Court
clarified that “the rule of independent review” applies irrespective
whether the fact-finding is performed “by a jury or by a trial
judge.”116 The Bose Court traced the practice of independent review
to its earlier defamation cases,117 obscenity cases,118 fighting
110 Id. at 1268 (“[T]he Court finds that the statement in the May 1970 Article that
‘individual instruments heard through the Bose system . . . tended to wander about the
room’ is false. The Court also finds that the statement is disparaging.”).
111 Id. at 1277 (“Based on the above finding that Seligson’s testimony to the contrary
is not credible, the Court further finds that at the time of the Article’s publication
Seligson knew that the words ‘individual instruments . . . tended to wander about the
room’ did not accurately describe the effects that he and Lefkow had heard during the
‘special listening test.’ Consequently, the Court concludes, on the basis of proof which it
considers clear and convincing, that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proving that
the defendant published a false statement of material fact with the knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.”).
112 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984)
(“We may accept all of the purely factual findings of the District Court and nevertheless
hold as a matter of law that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence
that Seligson or his employer prepared the loudspeaker article with knowledge that it
contained a false statement, or with reckless disregard of the truth.”).
113 Id. at 511.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 510-11.
116 Id. at 501.
117 Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
118 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973);
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words119 and incitement cases,120 and civil rights demonstration
cases.121
The next Part of this Essay examines how this
Constitutional Fact Doctrine has been applied by the courts and
highlights the circuit split that has persisted for over three decades.
III.

SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACT
DOCTRINE

Independent appellate review of constitutional facts is now
firmly established.122 But an unresolved question persists: does
independent
appellate
review
apply
symmetrically
or
As Professor Henry Monaghan observed,
asymmetrically.123
“Initially, the Court must decide whether both parties, or only the
free speech claimant, can demand independent appellate review;
that is, can the party opposing the free speech claim demand
independent appellate judgment on the first amendment law
application point?”124 Thus, does de novo review apply in equal
measure when the lower court makes a determination adverse to
the speaker as well as when the lower court makes a determination
friendly to the speaker? In other words, is independent review a
one-way street or a two-way street? This question was probed
during the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell.125

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
119 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
120 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
121 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
122 E.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 (1989)
(“The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to
support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. This rule is not simply premised
on common-law tradition, but on the unique character of the interest protected by the
actual malice standard. Our profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas,
as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area
of ‘breathing space’ so that protected speech is not discouraged.”) (citations omitted); see
also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 n.4 (2018).
123 See Chapman, supra note 23, at 229 (2015) (observing “the scope and precise
demands of the doctrine are somewhat hazy”).
124 Monaghan, supra note 10, at 245.
125 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: I thought you were suggesting
that in the First Amendment context, we’d have to consider
those issues again.
Mr. Isaacman: Justice O’Connor, I suggest that in the First
Amendment context, when a determination is made by a jury
that’s adverse to speech, and when a jury finds that the speaker
made statements that could be construed as statements of fact
and were knowingly false, then it is incumbent upon the Court
to take that review for the purpose of protecting the speaker.
And that’s what the First Amendment says, that you have to
protect the speaker.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist: You think Bose is a oneway street, then?
Mr. Alan L. Isaacman: Your Honor, I do think it’s a one-way
street. Bose is intended to protect the speaker . . . .126

The question whether Bose is a one-way street or a two-way
street was not mentioned in the Falwell opinion. Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice William Rehnquist confirmed that the
Court has been “particularly vigilant to ensure that individual
expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed
sanctions.”127 But the Falwell Court did not clarify the application
of independent constitutional fact review.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on whether
constitutional
fact
review
applies
symmetrically
or
asymmetrically,128 and for over thirty years the Supreme Court has
declined to resolve the split.129 As the Tenth Circuit noted, “the
Bose opinion does not make clear whether its more searching
review–whose purpose was to avoid ‘a forbidden intrusion’ on First
Amendment rights applies symmetrically to district court findings
that favor as well as disfavor the First Amendment claimant.”130
126 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988) (No. 86-1278).
127 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 51.
128 E.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting “circuits
have long been split” on whether a “more searching review . . . applies symmetrically to
district court findings that favor as well as disfavor the First Amendment claimant”)
(citations omitted).
129 E.g., Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981-92 (1988)
(White, J., noting circuit split and dissenting from denial of certiorari).
130 Friday, 525 F.3d at 950 (citations omitted).
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The First,131 Fifth,132 Tenth,133 and Eleventh134 Circuits apply
independent review indiscriminately as a two-way street. But this
symmetrical application is undertheorized. While a Tenth Circuit
panel was bound to follow precedent—in observing the circuit
split—the court stated, “we have never explained why, this Circuit
has applied Bose even when First Amendment claims prevailed
below, and thus taken the side of symmetry.”135
The Fourth,136 Seventh,137 and Ninth138 Circuits, on the other
hand, apply plenary review only one way and give deference to prospeech findings by the lower courts. In these circuits, the typical
appellate deference applies when the speech-claimant prevailed
131 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2008) (de novo review of the
district court finding that the challenged law was an unconstitutional abridgement of
free speech), abrogated on other grounds by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552
(2011).
132 Lindsay v. San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n deciding
whether restrictions on speech are justified, appellate courts do not rely heavily on
findings of fact made by trial courts.”) (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738,
748-49 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983)); Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8 (“The degree to which an
appellate court should defer to the ‘fact’ findings of a trial judge as to the latest truths in
the social sciences is an interesting question. The argument can be made that as long as
the trial court applied the right legal test or the appropriate level of scrutiny, his findings
under each prong of the test, here the Central Hudson Gas test, and his decision should
be upheld on appeal. . . . There are limits to which important constitutional questions
should hinge on the views of social scientists who testify as experts at trial. . . . Perhaps
for these reasons, the Supreme Court’s recent commercial speech and other relevant
speech cases indicate that appellate courts have considerable leeway in deciding whether
restrictions on speech are justified. In none of them did the Court rely heavily on fact
findings of the trial court.”).
133 Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 745 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 1984) (de novo
review of trial court’s finding that no “actual malice existed”).
134 Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (11th Cir.
1987) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion “that an appellate court is not bound
by the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review in determining whether a commercial
speech regulation directly advances the government’s goals or is more extensive than
necessary”) (citing Lindsay, 821 F.2d at 1107).
135 Friday, 525 F.3d at 950.
136 Multimedia Publ’g Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154,
160 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding “de novo review is required only where a district court
decision has left expressive activity unprotected and not, as here, where it has protected
the activity”).
137 Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1228-29 (7th Cir. 1985).
138 Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988) (“When a district
court holds a restriction on speech constitutional, we conduct an independent, de novo
examination of the facts. When the government challenges the district court’s holding
that the government has unconstitutionally restricted speech, on the other hand, we
review the district court findings of fact for clear error.”) (citing Planned Parenthood
Ass’n/Chicago Area, 767 F.2d at 1228-29).
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below on the rationale that in such cases there is no risk of a
“forbidden intrusion”139 on free expression. The Seventh Circuit
emphasized that this asymmetric review “reflects a special
solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by the First
Amendment have been unduly abridged.”140 Independent appellate
review, the Seventh Circuit noted, is designed to ensure “that the
suppression of protected speech—particularly unpopular or
controversial speech—is not insulated from close scrutiny by the
straightforward application of the clearly-erroneous rule.” 141
Moreover, an exception to the traditional deference is unnecessary
“for the government’s claim that it has been wrongly prevented
from restricting speech.”142 Guarding against the suppression of
protected speech is thus unnecessary when the lower court makes
a pro-speech finding. The next Part of this Essay outlines a
theoretical justification for asymmetric independent appellate
review, which both honors the aims the Constitutional Fact
Doctrine and provides an important limiting-principle for the
Doctrine.
IV.

PROPOSAL FOR ASYMMETRIC APPLICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FACT DOCTRINE

Independent appellate review of constitutional facts is a
powerful tool for protecting constitutional liberties.143 But this tool
comes with institutional costs—which are discussed in greater
detail below. Balancing the costs and benefits of the Constitutional
Fact Doctrine, the superior solution to the scope question is a oneway, asymmetrical application of independent appellate review.
To serve its core function, the Constitutional Fact Doctrine
requires a clear justification and a limiting-principle. As scholars
have charged, “no one appears to fully understand either the
underlying political or constitutional rationales for the doctrine, or
139 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 567-68
(1995) (“[O]ur obligation is to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record,’ . .
. so as to assure ourselves that th[is] judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion
on the field of free expression.”) (citations omitted).
140 Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area, 767 F.2d at 1229.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Illinois ex rel Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 621
(2003) (“As an additional safeguard responsive to First Amendment concerns, an
appellate court could independently review the trial court’s findings.”).
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the scope of its doctrinal or conceptual reach.”144 Independent
appellate review creates decision-making inefficiencies, and such
inefficiencies need a powerful justification.145 As the Eighth Circuit
once noted, limitless independent appellate review is “detrimental
to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of
litigants and the public in the decisions of the district courts, and
Lest
multiplies the number of appeals in such cases.”146
independent review overwhelm the appellate courts’ docket and
undermine the trial process, a limiting-principle for the application
of such review is needed.147
There has been a long-standing worry that there is no limit to
the facts that might be eligible for independent re-examination.148
Legal scholars have long recognized, “It would be not merely
inconvenient and burdensome to the courts, but altogether
disruptive of administrative processes, to hold that every fact-issue
on which a claim of constitutional right can be made to depend
becomes thereby entitled to a retrial on new evidence in a review
proceeding at law.”149 Fear of unlimited review of jury verdicts was
“one of the great obstacles in the path of adoption of the
Constitution,” and as Professor Charles Clark reminded, the debate
was resolved with “the added protection of the Seventh
Amendment.”150 The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to
a jury trial in “Suits at common law,”151 and bars appellate review
of facts found by a jury.152

Redish & Gohl, supra note 42, at 292.
See Louis, supra note 26, at 998 (“Crowded appellate dockets and the temporal
inability of appellate courts to immerse themselves in the record of every case have
necessitated deference to most trial level determinations having a substantial factual
component.”).
146 Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).
147 Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1434 (claiming “an effective limiting principle for
when constitutional fact review should be applied must be established if the doctrine is
to remain an effective tool by which appellate courts can fully protect constitutional
rights”).
148 See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 8, at 1072-82.
149 Id. at 1077.
150 Clark & Stone, supra note 25, at 193.
151 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In full, the Seventh Amendment provides: “In Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined
in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
152 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2571, at 224.
144
145
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Constitutional Fact Doctrine is a powerful bulwark for free
speech, but allowing it to “wander aimlessly”153 threatens core
constitutional values and our judicial processes. Appellate courts
continually seek to balance decision-making efficiency and
accuracy. But appellate courts risk being drawn into endless caseby-case determinations and constant fact-finding. Independent
appellate review is essentially a duplication of the trial court’s
effort. Expansive use of independent review threatens an appellate
court’s ability to meet its other judicial responsibilities.154 An
increased caseload diminishes an appellate court’s judicial
administrative efficiency.155 Judicial resources are not unlimited.
If the Constitutional Fact Doctrine is applied too promiscuously,
independent review will become unworkable.156 Symmetrical
review is too burdensome to the appellate courts for it to apply
indiscriminately.157 Independent review risks a slippery slope;
appellate courts risk facing a full-time job of independently
reviewing facts. Limited resources suggest that as the number of
appeals increases, the quality of the work may decrease.158 And if
process becomes unworkable, independent appellate review may be
abandoned altogether—forcing the baby out with the bathwater.159
153 Redish & Gohl, supra note 42, at 291 (“[T]he [constitutional fact] doctrine is truly
foundational to our constitutional system and essential to the judicial protection of
constitutional rights. And allowing the doctrine to wander aimlessly, as the Court has
and as leading constitutional scholars have urged, threatens core values of our
countermajoritarian Constitution.”).
154 Louis, supra note 26, at 1037 (“Free review of all constitutional fact
determinations, because such review requires a more careful examination of the whole
record, could have overwhelmed the Court or stolen precious time from its paramount
role as the oracle of constitutional and federal law.”).
155 Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 311
(2009) (“Appellate caseloads have skyrocketed, leaving judges with less time for each
case and thereby reducing any competence advantage that may have stemmed from
appellate judges’ ability to engage in less hurried contemplation.”).
156 Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1462 (“[T]he major concern with constitutional fact
doctrine is that if it is defined too expansively, it will overwhelm the docket of the federal
appellate courts.”).
157 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 127 (2008) (“Although every case is important, and appellate
review of case-specific fact-finding might catch some errors, on the whole, this argument
asserts, the costs to the system would be too great and, if done conscientiously, would
quickly overwhelm appellate courts.”).
158 Ann Zobrosky, Note, Constitutional Fact Review: An Essential Exception to
Anderson v. Bessemer, 62 IND. L.J. 1209, 1226 (1987) (“Appellate judges may find
themselves unable to maintain high quality work under the increasing time pressure.”).
159 Hoffman, supra note 23, at 1459 (“[A]n overly expansive constitutional fact
doctrine would either overwhelm the federal docket or force appellate courts to withdraw
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Without a limiting-principle on the scope of the doctrine, appellate
courts face a Hobson’s choice: tolerate constitutional error or
overwhelm their docket.160
Indiscriminate application of independent appellate review
also risks undermining the jury’s role in the judicial process.
Liberal de novo review reduces the jury trial to little more than a
“dry run.”161 As one scholar quipped, “why have trials at all if
appellate courts can simply start from scratch?”162 And Justice
Antonin Scalia once remarked that the majority’s apparent
disregard for trial court findings “makes evident that the parties to
this litigation could have saved themselves a great deal of time,
trouble, and expense by omitting a trial.”163 The jury is thereby
rendered a nullity if an appellate court can freely supplant its own
assessment of the facts.164
Insensitive application of independent review erodes
confidence and finality of the trial process.165 Independent
appellate review encourages litigants to seek a do-over in the
appellate courts. Widening appellate review has been criticized for
giving litigants “two bites out of the apple.”166 But often it is only
the wealthy who can afford two bites of the apple. When
impecunious defendants have weaker protections than wealthy
from independent review of facts altogether.”).
160 Louis, supra note 26, at 1038 (noting the Court’s “Hobson’s choice between
ignoring constitutionally offensive results rendered by trial level decision makers or
hearing a flood of fact specific, supervisory appeals”).
161 Chapman, supra note 23, at 206 (“Indeed, the whole fact-finding exercise at trial
is nothing more than a dry run for the court of appeals (or the Supreme Court). The
doctrine’s potential evisceration of a jury’s constitutional judgment therefore casts a pall
on the decision whether to send a constitutional question to the jury in the first place.”).
162 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights
Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1211 (2013).
163 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 585 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164 Christie, supra note 8, at 56 (“There would be no point in having a trial, however,
if the conclusions arrived at can be overturned merely because a subsequent reviewer
disagrees with them.”) (emphasis in original).
165 Borgmann, supra note 162, at 1211 (articulating concern that widespread
independent review “render[s] trials an ‘essentially pointless exercise’ in this manner
undermines trial courts’ legitimacy [and] threatens to erode the public’s and parties’
confidence in the conclusions of district courts, which often have the final word in
litigation.”) (citations omitted).
166 John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts—Is the “Clearly Erroneous” Rule Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 410
(1981) (quoting letter from Hon. Andrew Bogue, United States District Judge, District of
South Dakota, to Hon. John Nangle, United States District Judge, Eastern District of
Missouri (April 19, 1979)).
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defendants, concerns of unequal access to justice are exacerbated.
As Professor Charles Wright asked: “If in two similar cases the
person rich enough to afford an appeal gets a reversal, however just,
while the person of insufficient means to risk an appeal is forced to
live with the judgment of the trial court, has justice really been
improved?”167 Thus routine access to two bites raises distributive
concerns, undermines the finality of trial court findings, and
increases the caseload in the appellate courts.
An asymmetric application of the Constitutional Fact Doctrine
yields an optimal solution to the thorny question of how to cabin
constitutional fact review, while at the same time honoring the
aims of the Doctrine.
Independent appellate review of
constitutional facts should be a one-way street to insure protected
interests are not infringed. A one-way street is preferable in light
of the costs and burdens of overbroad application of independent
review. Independent appellate review should be reserved for those
instances when a First Amendment interest does not prevail in the
lower court.168 Appellate courts should engage in a second-look
review to guard against an inappropriate deprivation of protected
speech interests.
To that end, a one-way street ensures
constitutional liberties are protected to the highest degree.
On the other hand, a symmetrical, two-way street puts
constitutional rights at risk.169 Fact-finders are not the only
decision-makers who can err; appellate courts can also make
mistakes.170 And appellate courts should not be allowed to
erroneously reverse a speech-protective decision by the lower
court.171 Constitutional fact review is a speech-protective tool, thus
167 Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 751, 780 (1957).
168 Cf. Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1589-93 (2000) (arguing for a one-way ratchet preference for
freedoms).
169 Zobrosky, supra note 158, at 1248-49 (“[C]omplete de novo review for
constitutional fact cases places a party claiming a constitutional rights violation under
a greater risk than a plaintiff or defendant in another type of case. If the trial court finds
that the constitutional rights violation occurred, the appellate court could freely review
and reverse the decision, unchecked by the clearly erroneous standard. Therefore, a
party claiming a constitutional rights violation would run a double risk of having his
claim improperly denied.”).
170 As an appellate judge once noted: “Though trial judges may at times be mistaken
as to facts, appellate judges are not always omniscient.” Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537,
542 (2d Cir. 1950) (Chase, J., dissenting).
171 See Childress, supra note 10, at 1238.

2019]

FRUCTIFYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT

135

a two-way street “defies the basic point of the doctrine.”172 Some
scholars have argued for symmetric review out of fairness to the
plaintiff.173 While seeking fairness for the plaintiff, such review
threatens the speaker-defendant’s constitutional interests.174
Symmetric application of independent review has been called a
“bizarre formalism” and “a foolish consistency.”175
All fact-finders are capable of erring. As scholars know, “Any
factfinding system will generate two kinds of outcomes: some that
are correct and some that are in error.”176 Allocations of burdens of
proof implicitly recognize this possibility of error.177 Juries can get

172 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 1-3 FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW, § 2.19 (4th ed. 2010) (“[I]f de novo review applies because of the First
Amendment, scrutiny of pro-speech findings defies the basic point of the doctrine.”).
173 Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2442 (1998) (“In our view,
independent judgment review of the idea-expression decision is valuable even when the
defendant won at trial: Whoever won, independent review should produce more
refinement of the legal standard, something Bose says is constitutionally valuable.
Moreover, a symmetric rule is fairer to plaintiffs. Copyright plaintiffs’ claims are not
claims of constitutional right, but they are certainly important; as Harper & Row pointed
out, copyright law itself serves First Amendment goals.”).
174 Cf. Ned Snow, Fair Use As A Matter of Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011)
(“Replacing the usual clear error standard with de novo would serve only to threaten the
jury verdict that favored the defendant speaker.”).
175 Childress, supra note 10, at 1318 (“For if the rule is wholly one of protecting free
speech, it would be a bizarre formalism—a foolish consistency—to apply it where the
result would allow more ready reversal of one whose rights were protected below.”).
176 See R.S. Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two
Errors and the Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 864 (1988); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982).
177 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
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it wrong,178 trial courts can get it wrong,179 and appellate courts can
get it wrong.180 In light of this reality, how much “wrongness” are
we willing to tolerate?181 And, more to the point, what type of
“wrongness” are we willing to tolerate?
Not all errors raise the same degree of concerns; not all errors
warrant the same response. We have limited judicial resources and
respect for the judicial process discourages unnecessarily
duplicative efforts.182 Thus independent review should be reserved
for instances of particular concern that justify an exception, namely
underenforcement of constitutional freedoms.183
178 Compare Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (expressing concern
that a jury is “unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and holds a
real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of those ‘vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.’”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)), and DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 123 (2008) (“Because the jury represents values
associated with the political majority, it cannot fully be entrusted with protection of the
values inherent in the Bill of Rights.”), with Chapman, supra note 23, at 237 (“[T]he jury,
whatever its competence in other sorts of cases, has a unique ‘constitutional competence,’
based on its unique ability to bring a popular perspective to the application of
constitutional law, an ability that accords with the history and purposes of its role in
constitutional structure.”), and Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183, 1185 (1991) (arguing the role of the jury was to “safeguard
liberty” “more than a permanent government official—even an independent Article III
judge.”).
179 E.g., Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74
MARQ. L. REV. 231, 239 (1991) (“[A]re appellate judges better qualified than their
counterparts on trial bench? Perhaps, if only by dint of numbers; three (or seven or nine)
heads are, so hopes the law, better than one.”); Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District
Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 527 (1969) (“This
does not assume that circuit judges are wiser than district judges; that I very much
doubt. But three heads are better than one, and the tempo of the work of appellate courts
allows for reflection and instructions that is not available to trial judges.”).
180 E.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1950) (Chase, J., dissenting)
(“Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to facts, appellate judges are not
always omniscient.”); Wright, supra note 167, at 782 (“[T]he best way to do justice in the
long run is to confine to a minimum appellate tampering with the work of the trial
courts.”); Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for
and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1412 (2003) (“Because judges
(like everyone else) are human, their decisions will sometimes be wrong.”).
181 Cf. Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D.
173, 176 (1979) (“There are wide variations in the degree of ‘wrongness’ which will be
tolerated.”); Victor J. Gold, Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury Inferential Error, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 391 (1986) (“Juries decide facts by considering evidence and drawing
inferences from it. But jurors are human and humans commit inferential errors.”).
182 See Paranzino, supra note 68, at 492 (“Careful allocation of independent
appellate review, however, would allow scarce appellate resources to be targeted for the
areas of the law which require extra attention.”).
183 Cross, supra note 168, at 1592 (arguing underenforcement of constitutional
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To borrow the statistician’s nomenclature, we can classify
errors as Type I and Type II.184 A Type I error rejects the null
hypothesis when it is actually true, in favor of the alternative
hypothesis (i.e., a false positive).185 On the other hand, a Type II
error fails to reject (i.e., accepts) the null hypothesis when the
alternative hypothesis is true (i.e., a false negative). To borrow
criminal law’s proposition that an individual is “innocent until
proven guilty,” a Type I error imprisons an innocent person,
whereas a Type II error allows a guilty person to go free.186 In this
instance the Type I error is the primary error to avoid, the Type II
error is a secondary error. Concern about such Type I errors have
long pervaded Anglo-American jurisprudence.187 English jurist
William Blackstone urged it is “better that ten guilty persons
escape, than that one innocent suffer.”188 Benjamin Franklin
increased the ratio and urged that it is better that “a hundred guilty
persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer.”189
Statistics teaches that an inverse relationship exists between
the two types of errors. As we change the procedural mechanisms
and make it harder to create Type I errors (e.g., convicting the
innocent), we increase the risk of Type II errors (e.g., failing to
convict the guilty).190 Generally we trade off errors, rather than
freedoms “are both more serious and more likely to occur than” overenforcement of
constitutional freedoms).
184 Note that statistics can inform the decision-making process without devolving
into a proposition that legal procedure should be interpreted in probabilistic terms.
Radford, supra note 176, at 859.
185 See id. at 851; see also Jasper P. Sluijs, Network Neutrality Between False
Positives and False Negatives: Introducing A European Approach to American
Broadband Markets, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 77, 103 (2010) (“A type-one error designates a
false null hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled true; whereas, a type-two error is a true
null hypothesis that is mistakenly labeled false.”).
186 Cf. McChesney, supra note 180, at 1412 (“Type I error refers to a ‘false positive,’
analogous in the legal context to mistakenly imposing liability on an innocent defendant.
Type II error is a ‘false negative,’ or failing to punish a guilty party. Each type of error
has a cost associated with it.”).
187 Cf. Radford, supra note 176, at 852 (“The Anglo-American legal system has
traditionally reserved its greatest concern for avoiding Type I errors.”).
188 Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352).
189 Shailly Agnihotri & Cassie Veach, Reclaiming Restorative Justice: An Alternate
Paradigm for Justice, 20 CUNY L. REV. 323, 330 (2017) (quoting 11 BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN, WORKS 13 (John Bigelow ed., 1904) (letter from Benjamin Franklin to
Benjamin Vaughan dated Mar. 14, 1785)).
190 Radford, supra note 176, at 851 (“In general, an inverse relationship exists
between the relative incidence of the two kinds of errors. Type I errors can be reduced
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eliminate them altogether. But depending on the types of errors
involved, such a tradeoff may be acceptable. As one scholar noted,
“convicting the innocent involves greater negative externalities—
social costs beyond those borne by the parties—than acquitting the
guilty.”191 Thus decreasing Type I errors and increasing Type II
errors is often acceptable, especially when Type I errors implicate
fundamental liberties.192
For present purposes, the proposition is that the speech in
question is constitutionally protected, and the alternative
proposition is that the speech is not protected, and therefore can be
prohibited and punished. A Type I error erroneously concludes that
the speech is unprotected, when in fact, the speech is protected (e.g.,
erroneously punishes non-obscene speech). And a Type II error
erroneously concludes that the speech is protected, when in fact,
the speech can lawfully be prohibited (e.g., erroneously fails to
punish obscene speech). The cost of a Type I error is an erroneous
deprivation of a constitutionally protected speech right, which is
worse than the cost of a Type II error—namely failing to punish
speech that lawfully could be prohibited. Others have urged that
constitutional fact review should be reserved for “extraordinary
circumstances.”193 I argue, more specifically, that constitutional
fact review should be reserved to correct for Type I errors.
Legal safe harbors implicitly reflect concerns about Type I
versus Type II errors.
First Amendment jurisprudence in
particular implicitly recognizes the risk of Type I errors. As one
scholar observed, “The risk of erroneous verdicts for plaintiffs is
implicit in the Court’s concern with possible ‘chilling’ effects and
the need to provide ‘breathing room’ for constitutionally protected
speech.”194 A plurality of the Court once explained that in a normal
civil case, applying the preponderance of the evidence standard,
“‘we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an
erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an
merely by increasing the level of confidence needed to reject the null hypothesis;
however, this will simultaneously increase the risk of Type II error.”).
191 Id. at 849.
192 Cf. Willard K. Tom, Game Theory in the Everyday Life of the Antitrust
Practitioner, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 468 (1997) (“If the costs of false positives are
high and those for false negatives low, we may tend to adopt rules of per se lawfulness
often and rules of per se unlawfulness seldom.”) .
193 Cf. Paranzino, supra note 68, at 492-93 (urging independent appellate review
should be reserved for “extraordinary circumstances”).
194 Radford, supra note 176, at 875 n.149.
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erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor.’”195 In a defamation case,
however, the Court noted that “we view an erroneous verdict for the
plaintiff as most serious.”196 Speaking for the plurality, Justice
Brennan warned that “Not only does it mulct the defendant for an
innocent misstatement . . . but the possibility of such error . . . would
create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the First
Amendment cannot tolerate.”197 Thus the risk of an erroneous
deprivation has implications far beyond the parties to the suit; it
threatens to chill the speech of others.198 To parry such risks, the
Supreme Court has added procedural protections in speech cases,
like altering plaintiff’s burdens of proof and providing a special
exception to typical standards of appellate review.
To consider what type of wrongness we are willing to tolerate
it is helpful to conceptualize the court system as having both a
horizontal plane and a vertical plane. To suss out the advantages
of categorizing legal errors as Type I and II, the trial court level can
be viewed on a horizontal plane, whereas an appellate court can be
viewed on a vertical plane. On a horizontal plane, procedural
changes create tradeoffs between Type I and Type II errors. On this
horizontal plane, changing procedural mechanisms to decrease
Type I errors will correspondingly increase the risk of Type II
errors. Changing burdens of proof at trial, for example, can
decrease Type I errors, but will increase the risk of Type II errors.
In defamation cases involving public officials, the Sullivan Court
shifted the burden of proving falsity to the plaintiff, rather than
placing the burden of proving truth on the defendant.199 The Court
recognized the difficulty of carrying the burden of proof and erred
on the side of protecting “would-be critics of official conduct [who]
may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so.”200 Procedural changes in the trial courts create
195 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), abrogated on
other grounds by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
196 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50.
197 Id.
198 See Couture, supra note 20, at 916; see also Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and
the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 695 (1978)
(positing the degree of chill depends on “the probability of an erroneous verdict times the
harm produced by such a verdict”).
199 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
200 Id.
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tradeoffs; as we make it harder to create Type I errors (e.g.,
punishing protected speech), we increase the possibility of Type II
errors (e.g., failing to punish unprotected speech). By pulling
procedural levers in the trial courts (e.g., shifting burdens of proof
on falsity or fault), Type I errors are reduced, but the risk of Type
II errors is increased. It is just the inherent tradeoff.
But changing appellate standards of review, on the other
hand, changes procedural mechanisms on a vertical plane.
Appellate review does not operate on the horizontal plane with the
trial court level, rather it conceptually adds a vertical dimension.
If an asymmetric review is introduced on the vertical plane at the
appellate court level, there is no risk of simply trading off errors.
In a one-way review, only Type I errors are reviewed on appeal, and
only Type I errors can get corrected. On the other hand, symmetric
appellate review introduces the possibility that an appellate court
will erroneously reverse a pro-speech finding. In other words, in a
two-way review an appellate court may create a Type I error where
one did not previously exist. If independent appellate review is
limited to reviewing for Type I errors, appellate courts can only
reverse Type I errors, not create them.201 Thus the one-way,
asymmetric review of constitutional facts is the optimal solution to
reduce speech-harming Type I errors.202
CONCLUSION
Independent appellate review is an exception to the traditional
deference accorded to fact-finding in the lower court. Findings by a
trial court are upheld unless clearly erroneous. Findings by a jury
are upheld unless no “reasonable jury” could arrive at that verdict.
The typical standards of appellate review apply, unless enhanced
scrutiny is warranted. The Bose Court has explained that enhanced
201 It is, of course, possible that an appellate court may erroneously fail to reverse a
Type I error. While regrettable, some amount of wrongness is bound to exist within a
system. Constitutional Fact Doctrine does not guarantee an error-free system.
Asymmetric review is the optimal, albeit imperfect, solution to minimize Type I errors.
202 Other scholars have also urged an asymmetric review in certain cases. See Snow,
supra note 174, at 3 (“I propose that the standard of review should always favor fair
users, such that de novo should govern where copyright holders prevail at trial, whereas
clear error should govern where fair users prevail. I further propose that at trial, judges
should rule on summary judgment only in favor of fair users; they should rule for
copyright holders on summary judgment in the rarest of circumstances, if at all. I thus
propose a double standard of review and a one-sided application of summary judgment—
all favoring the defendant fair user.”).
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scrutiny is warranted when First Amendment rights are at risk:
“[W]e have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an
obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole
record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute
a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’”203
But if First Amendment interests were protected by the lower
court, then the justification for an exception for usual deference is
not warranted. Independent review is applied for an instrumental
purpose, namely to ensure that protected speech is not
impermissibly censored. Only if the lower court makes a finding
adverse to a speech claimant does the need for special protection
arise. As the Bose Court explained, “to be sure that the speech in
question actually falls within the unprotected category and to
confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within
acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected
expression will not be inhibited” the appellate court is empowered
to conduct an independent review of the record.204
Independent appellate review has costs. And the added costs
for the exception are not warranted if a pro-speech finding was
made at the lower court. Independent review is the exception, not
the rule. As a corollary, deference to the lower court is the rule, not
the exception.205 As the Bose Court emphasized, “Our standard of
review must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the rule of
independent review applied in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.”206
To apply independent review symmetrically misconstrues
First Amendment jurisprudence and erodes the decision-making
203 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285).
204 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 505.
205 As the Court explained:

Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost
in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on appeal
have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on
persuading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one;
requiring them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is
requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a different context, the trial on
the merits should be “the ‘main event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’”
For these reasons, review of factual findings under the clearly-erroneous
standard—with its deference to the trier of fact—is the rule, not the exception.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
206 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 499.
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responsibilities in the judicial process. Independent review is a
special exception and should not be applied indiscriminately.
Without a limiting-principle to control its scope, symmetrical
application of independent review undermines the Doctrine’s
function.
Asymmetric application of independent review is
consistent with the Court’s focus on minimizing erroneous
deprivation of speech rights.207 To safeguard and fructify First
Amendment interests, constitutional fact review should be applied
asymmetrically to correct for Type I errors.208

207 But see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (applying de novo appellate review
where the fact-finder had found in favor of free expression).
208 Cf. Amanda Reid, Safeguarding Fair Use Through First Amendment’s
Asymmetric Constitutional Fact Review, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 23 (2019) (arguing
for a one-way, asymmetric review of copyright fair use determinations adverse to freespeech/fair-use-claimants).

